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depending on the relative damage inflicted by the two industries on the environment, it 
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Abstract. Industrial pollution can have damaging e®ects on resource-based
productive sectors. International trade creates opportunities for overexploita-
tion of the open-access renewable resource but also for separating the sectors
spatially. The paper shows that, depending on the relative damage in°icted
by the two industries on the environment, it is possible that the production
externality will persist and that specialization in the dirty good may not be
the obvious choice from a welfare perspective. Also, the resource exporter does
not necessarily have to lose from trade even when specializing incompletely,
due to the partially o®setting external e®ects.
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1. Introduction
Around the world, mostly in developing countries, but by no means limited
to them, open-access ¯shing areas are often located in the proximity of polluting
manufacturing facilities. Examples range from the North Atlantic salmon ¯shery,
1
to the lobster ¯shery in the North Paci¯c, the collapsed walleye ¯shery in the
Tittabawassee River in Michigan, the Baia Mare, Romania cyanide pollution of
the rivers adjacent to gold mines and countless (less publicized) local problems in
the less-developed world. As the more biology-oriented literature documents, for
many species of ¯sh, the nursery grounds are located in the coastal areas, which are
also the more polluted ones, due to the toxic waste spilled directly into the sea, or
carried by rivers from inland. Due in part to poor regulation of the environment,
many developing countries experienced an accelerated depletion of their resources
after opening up to international trade. The welfare e®ects of this form of tragedy
of the commons ampli¯ed by trade are likely to be quite signi¯cant in poor, small,
developing economies, where the resource sector has an important share both in
exports and GDP. At the same time, the phenomenon of dirty-industry migration
from North to South - as a possible e®ect of tightening up of standards in the
developed world - may result in increased industrial pollution of the environment.
Openness makes both scenarios theoretically plausible.
Renewable resources can be under two types of pressures: excessive harvesting,
especially where there is no e®ective management, and pollution from other sectors.
Previous work has looked at each of these pressures individually. Brander and
Key words and phrases. renewable resources, pollution, production externalities, environment,
international trade.
Many thanks to Prof. Brian Copeland and Prof. Sumeet Gulati for valuable suggestions. The
usual caveat applies.
1 Among the chief causes cited as contributing to the collapse of North Atlantic ¯sheries were
pollution and over-harvesting.
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Taylor (1997) show that a small open economy that exports an open access resource
will su®er resource depletion and will incur a long run real income loss, whereas a
country that imports the resource will gain from trade, because pressure is taken o®
the resource. Copeland and Taylor (1999) show that with a cross-sectoral pollution
externality, trade tends to cause small countries to specialize. Severe resource
depletion may occur. Also, in their model, a resource exporting country will gain
from trade because it leads to a contraction of the polluting sector. However, many
renewable resources are in reality concomitantly subject to both types of pressures.
The interaction between pollution and international trade has been extensively
studied recently. The approach used in the recent book by Copeland and Taylor
(2003)is to build a uni¯ed GE framework which allows them to clearly identify
the various e®ects that characterize the interaction and to take into account the
endogenous nature of environmental policy. Yet, as they acknowledge, for poor
resource exporters, the evolution of the stock of natural resources with trade is
likely to be more important than pollution for their welfare (Copeland and Taylor
(2003), p. 362). The manufacturing sector is generally under-developed and so the
e®ects of additional local pollution on the consumers are likely to be low. Then,
a key mechanism identi¯ed by the authors as in°uencing the level of pollution
with trade: namely the endogenous policy response - may not play as important a
role.
2 However, the existence of a polluting sector and its external e®ects cannot
be dismissed even in these economies. Some would argue it is likely to become even
more of a problem, as production in the North moves towards cleaner service-based
sectors while the South gets a higher share of world's manufacturing.
The literature documents many instances of habitat quality in°uencing popula-
tion levels, harvesting, and having detrimental welfare e®ects. For instance, several
examples are provided in Knowler (2002), in a review of bioeconomic models em-
ployed to estimate the welfare e®ects of environmental quality.
3 Relying on the
motivating examples discussed above, the basic question addressed in this paper is:
what is the e®ect of trade when an un-managed renewable resource is subject to the
two interacting problems: overharvesting and pollution? The present work builds
on the baseline Brander and Taylor (1997) model and the subsequent Brander and
Taylor (1998) and resembles the two in the fact that it deals with an open-access
natural resource and the impact of international trade on its stock. It departs from
the original Brander and Taylor framework in that it also assumes the existence of
production externalities, as in Copeland and Taylor (1999). However, unlike the
latter model, where the production in the clean sector is only a function of the
\environmental capital" stock,
4 in the present paper the production of the \clean"
good also depletes the stock of the resource. It is argued that the fact that both
2 Another reason may be that the democratic channels by which higher pollution triggers a
policy response may not be functioning properly.
3 Some examples provided in Knowler (2002) include: the e®ect of changes in water salinity
on shrimp catch in Pamlico Sound, North Carolina (Swallow (1994)), the impact of increased
nutrient and sediment loads on aquatic vegetation in Chesapeake Bay (Kahn and Kemp 1985),
the e®ect of increased nutrient concentration on the Black Sea anchovy ¯shery in Knowler and
Barbier (2001). Even closer to the spirit of this paper, Loomis (1998) analyze the e®ect of logging
on the downstream ¯sheries in the form of sediments and water temperature changes.
4 i.e. cleanliness of a river, soil and there is no harvesting of the renewable resource per se.RENEWABLE RESOURCES, POLLUTION AND TRADE IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 3
sectors exert a di®erentiated pressure on the stock of the resource proves to be
important in establishing the results.
5
To brie°y preview the results, the autarkic equilibrium in this economy is inef-
¯cient. Besides the open access problem, whose magnitude is a function of demand
parameters, there is the uninternalized e®ect of pollution. However, opening up to
trade allows the economy to potentially do better in the long run. Non-traditional
gains from trade occur from spatially separating the con°icting sectors by focus-
ing production on the area of comparative advantage. It is argued that - under
certain conditions - specialization in the \dirty" good can be detrimental, while
specialization in the resource good can be welfare-improving.
6 The policy relevance
of the paper may be framed in terms of the industrial planning challenges faced
by a small resource-endowed developing economy that eventually becomes open to
trade. Even when disutility costs to consumers are small, excessive industrialization
imposes external costs via the environment-based sectors.
Starting with a small open economy, the analysis then moves further to en-
dogenize the international price formation in a two-countries case. The analysis
of welfare changes can give an indication as to what drives the results and will
possibly suggest a direction for policy measures. If the only commodity that is
traded once the economy opens up to trade is the manufacturing good, then spa-
tial separation will likely reduce the stress on the resource and may bring welfare
gains, provided that the country in question starts importing the industrial good.
If the resource-based product (e.g. ¯sh) is also tradable,
7 then overdepletion makes
the results ambiguous, and several cases may develop, based on the parameters
of the system. The two externalities here have partially o®setting e®ects, which
in autarchy could bring the economy closer to a ¯rst best optimum than in the
simple over-harvesting ¯shery model. As can be expected, opening up to trade
alters these e®ects. Whether the country stays diversi¯ed or completely specializes
in one of the sectors with trade will play a role in deciding the welfare gains or
losses from trade, as will the relative impact of the two sectors on the stock of the
resource. Here the economy can in fact specialize in any of the sectors, and trade
can bring a welfare improvement or a welfare decline. Increasing production in the
relatively more harmful sector will have the e®ect of decreasing the stock under the
autarkic steady state level, while (even incompletely) specializing in the relatively
environmentally-friendly sector will raise the stock above it, likely in°uencing the
comparative advantage of the country.
There are not many papers dealing explicitly with the issue of renewable re-
sources management with pollution. However, a few papers deal with related issues.
Knowler, Barbier and Strand (2002) look at the e®ect on the stock of a resource
of nutrient concentration increase of water. However, here the polluting factor is
exogenous and there is no trade-o® between the resource sector and the pollut-
ing sector, which is captured in our model. McConnell and Strand (1989) analyze
5 Thinking about other real-life examples: if sector H is tourism and sector M is a polluting
manufacture, it is likely that both activities pollute the adjacent lake or river, although conceivably,
to quite di®erent degrees. Also, given the wide evidence documenting the damaging e®ect of
aquaculture for the environment, M can be thought of as ¯sh or shrimp farming, while H is the
harvesting of the wild resource.
6 In a stylized way, this result runs contrary to the so-called Dutch Disease \symptoms" of the
\Natural Resources Curse".
7 And this is the less restrictive, more realistic case.4 HORAT »IU A. RUS
water quality impact on commercial ¯shing when consumer perception of better
water quality shifts out demand, while the supply of ¯sh increases as well with
water quality. Here the open-access dimension is missing, and the focus is domes-
tic. Also, a special issue of Environmental Resource Economics dedicated to the
Economics of Non-convex Ecosystems
8 contains papers that speci¯cally deal with
existence of competitive equilibria, multiple basins of attraction, threshold and pos-
itive feedback e®ects and the local aspect of many environmental externalities. The
closest to this work is a recent paper by Smulders, van Soest and Withagen (2004)
which focuses on habitat destruction by having a speci¯c factors model with three
sector, two of which are dependant on `land' as a resource base (harvesting) or fac-
tor of production (agriculture). While the paper is similar in the sense that their
model also includes both `within-industry' and `between industry' externalities, the
driving force of their results is the interplay between the negative long-run stock
e®ects and the positive short-run search costs reducing e®ect of a shrinking habitat
size. Their work also reverses some of the results in Brander and Taylor papers,
yet the model seems to only apply to terrestrial resources.
9 In the present paper,
inter-industry externalities are only negative: pollution reduces the stock size, di-
minishing productivity in the harvesting sector, and it also increases the implicit
search costs, as sparsely distributed marine resources are harder to catch. To the
best knowledge of the author, the exact focus of this paper, who better ¯ts the
pollution-marine life motivating example, has not been previously undertaken.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section analyzes the
autarkic general equilibrium in the short run and then in the long run, introducing
a non-convexity issue. The third section then looks at the open economy equilib-
rium, analyzing possible specialization avenues and their impact on the stock of the
resource and on welfare. The last section concludes and points to possible future
research directions.
2. The Autarkic Model
Let the stock of the renewable resource S grow according to a natural growth




= G(S(t)) ¡ H(t) ¡ Z(t)
where H is the harvest level and Z is the detrimental e®ect of pollution on the
resource growth and where we take the stock S to follow a logistic growth function
that was shown to perform quite well empirically for some species of ¯sh:10




8 ERE (December 2003, Volume 26 Issue 4), with papers from: Dasgupta and MÄ aler, Chave and
Levin, Scholes, Brock and Starrett, MÄ aler, Xepapadeas, and de Zeeuw, Crepin, Arrow, Dasgupta
and MÄ aler, which are concerned with topics such as the economics of savannas, pollution in shallow
lakes, multiple species forests and sustainable development.
9 For marine resources it is harder to come up with activities that physically diminish the
habitat.
10 Brander and Taylor (1997) list Pearl (1930) and Feller (1940) for empirical support of the
logistic form of growth and Paterson and Wilen (1977) for empirical support of the choice of
harvesting production function. See Brander and Taylor (1997), p. 531-532.RENEWABLE RESOURCES, POLLUTION AND TRADE IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 5
where r, the intrinsic growth rate of the resource and K, the carrying capacity are
known parameters.11
It can be seen from equation (2.1) that activity in both sectors of the economy
in°uence the change of stock.12 As shown in the original ¯shery model, under open
access, extraction will occur at zero pro¯t levels, due to free entry into the sector
that has the e®ect of driving rents to zero. The added complication here is the
negative externality imposed by the polluting sector.
2.1. Supply.
There are two productive sectors in this economy: harvesting of the renewable
natural resource (H) and manufacturing (M). Both sectors are using one primary
input: labour (L). In addition, H-production also depends on the stock of the
resource according to a typical SchÄ afer yield function:
(2.2) H = qSLH;
while
(2.3) M = LM
that is, manufacturers use only labour and produce according to this very simple
constant returns production function. However, this is a polluting activity. Pollu-
tion (Z) is generated at rate alpha in the process, so that
Z = ®M = ®LM:
Assume pollution does not accumulate13, there is no abatement and no pollution
policy14 and emissions intensity is ®.
Let M be the numeraire commodity and so
pM = 1:
From the zero-pro¯t condition in the M-sector: ¦M = M ¡ wLM = 0 we obtain
w = 1.
Because L is the only factor ¯rms in the harvesting industry have to pay for
under open access, pro¯ts will be:
¦H = pH ¡ wLH = pqSLH ¡ wLH
11 Jinji endogenizes the carrying capacity. In his forestry model K depends linearly on the
stock of the \base resource:" land. A number of comparative statics exercises can be performed
when K is allowed to vary. See Jinji (2003), p. 6.
12 To be accurate, due to the multiplicity of biological/natural and anthropogenic interactions
existent in a marine environment, there is little conclusive evidence to date that `normal' pollution
actually kills ¯sh, except for `ecological disasters.' However, the scienti¯c evidence that pollution
leads to perturbations in the reproducing system of ¯sh is available. Thus, the e®ect of the
pollution externality on the stock of ¯sh can also enter in a more complicated manner than here,
namely via an intrinsic growth function r(Z) that is decreasing in pollution: dr/dZ<0. Yet,
our speci¯cation is equivalent to one in which the `true' intrinsic growth rate ½ is diminished
by a properly-weighted pollution e®ect to yield the `actual' intrinsic growth rate r as follows:
r = [½ ¡ Z
S (1 ¡ S
K )¡1].
13 Pollution just °ows downstream if the pollutant and the clean sector are located along a
river. Treating pollution as a stock might be more appropriate for lakes or oceans. This scenario
is omitted here for simplicity.
14 there is no regulation that internalizes any of the two externalities: open-access or pollution.6 HORAT »IU A. RUS
and the free entry/zero pro¯t condition implies:




Therefore, if both sectors of the economy are active in autarky, the relative price
of the harvesting good is determined by the stock level.
2.2. Demand.
On the demand side, there is a representative consumer with preferences de-
scribed by a Cobb-Douglas utility function including both goods, and with (1-¯)
the share of M, ¯ the share of H in total spending.15 In the ¯rst best equilibrium
there are resource rents. However, in our open-access framework, rents are dissi-
pated and the only income accruing to the consumer is the wage. The consumer
supplies inelastically one unit of labour and solves:
Max
H;M
U = H¯M1¡¯ s:t: pH + M = w:





1 and on aggregate H =
w¯L
p ;M = (1 ¡ ¯)wL;
where L is the total endowment of labour, which coincides here with total pop-




for w = 1:
2.3. The Short Run Autarkic Equilibrium.
Since there is only one primary factor L, the economy is Ricardian and the
temporary PPF will be a straight line, as both ¯rms and consumers' problems
assume a ¯xed stock of the resource S. Notice the fact that in the short run the
negative production externality does not manifest itself.17 For a given stock of the
resource S, LH = H
qS, while LM = M. The labour employment in the economy is
divided between harvesting and manufacturing: L = M + H
qS which implies that
H = qSL ¡ qSM
describes the linear temporary PPF. The short-run equilibrium is found by equating
expressions (2.4) and (2.5). This yields
(2.6) H = q¯LS and M = (1 ¡ ¯)L
as the short-run equilibrium outputs.
15 The focus on production externalities developed here is particularly applicable to devel-
oping resources-based economies: their environments are still relatively pristine and the health
consequences of industrial pollution may not be as severe, thereby making the assumption of no
consumer-disutility of pollution more credible. Also, an endogenous policy response mechanism
may not work, due to the fact that environmental-groups pressure is weak and/or the countries'
democratic channels are not functioning properly.
16 Yet another assumption implicit in our model is that pollution or perceived water quality
does not shift demand for ¯sh, as in McConnel and Strand (1989), p. 285-287), where consumers
use water quality as an indicator of ¯sh quality. There, better water quality under open access
may have the perverse e®ect of reducing social surplus.






In autarky, the use of labour in manufacturing (and therefore the amount of
pollution) does not depend on the use of labour for harvesting, due to ¯xed pro-
portionality. Then, the evolution of the stock of resource in the short-run can be
obtained by subtracting the e®ect Z of manufacturing on the change of stock S from
the growth expression, and then interacting it with the harvest function to ¯nd the
open-access level of stock S0.
In Figure 2, A would be the open-access extraction point in the absence of the
manufacturing sector, or if there was no production externality. With pollution,
we have:
Z(t) = ®(1 ¡ ¯)L
which would be a straight line if represented in the space of Figure 2. Given the
level of pollution Z, which is not a function of the stock S, the open-access stock
equilibrium condition for the renewable resource is still that: dS
dt = 0, which implies
(2.7) H(t) + Z(t) = G(S(t)):
As it is apparent from the picture, the harvest will take place at a lower level in
the presence of pollution of the stock, as one would expect.
Substituting the known expressions into (2.7) we get:




which is a quadratic equation yielding two possible steady states SA
1 and SA
2 as
functions of the parameters.
Solving the quadratic equation:
r
K
S2 + (q¯L ¡ r)S + ®(1 ¡ ¯)L = 0
yields as discriminant ¢ = (q¯L ¡ r)2 ¡ 4r
K ®(1 ¡ ¯)L and the roots are:
S1;2 =





When ¢ > 0, the roots are real and there exists a non-extinction steady-state





















interior solution: no feasible ¯shery due to excessive pollution. The condition for
the existence of real roots is that




which can be loosely translated as: high q (the productivity parameter in harvest-
ing), high ¯ (strong consumer preference for H), low intrinsic growth rate (r), high
carrying capacity of the environment (K).
Denoting by SA
1 , SA
2 the two autarkic steady-state stock levels, notice from
the graph in Figure 2 that SA
1 is stable, while SA
2 is not, where SA





2r=K . This means that, regardless of the starting stock level S0,
provided it is not to the left of SA
2 ,18 the stock level will move to SA
1 in the long
run closed economy. Notice that the level of the stock in the long run under open




1 into (2.4) and (2.6) we get pA = 1
qSA
1
and HA = q¯LSA
1 ; MA =
(1 ¡ ¯)L, respectively.
Note by referring again to the graph, that provided the level of pollution Z is
too high, which is the same as saying if ®, (1 ¡ ¯), L are \too high,"19 we can
get the case where no exploitation of the resource is possible, due to the strong
externality that decreases the stock and raises the costs of extraction. Also, if the
growth function of the stock would be depensatory (which may be the case for some
species or circumstances) instead of taking the compensatory logistic form, then it
may be relatively easy to get extinction and total collapse of the extraction sector,
in which case M ceases to create an externality in production. However, we will
18 The case of initial over-depletion of the renewable resource
19 which means, keeping the order, that: M is very pollution intensive, consumers have strong
tastes for the manufacturing good or the country is very populous, respectively. Interpreting
these conditions con¯rms the intuition for cases where no equilibrium with strictly positive stock
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abstract from such complications here and look instead at interior solutions, where
the economy is diversi¯ed and the conditions necessary for SA
1 > 0 are met by the
parameters.
2.4. Dynamics in Autarky and Non-Convexity.
We turn at this point to analyze the dynamic transition towards the steady state
in this economy. Recall that the PPF in the short run, i.e. for a given stock level S,
is a straight line. In the long run, production adjusts and will be in°uenced by the
cross-sectoral production externalities, potentially yielding a convex PPF. Because
in a dynamic setting, the manufacturing sector imposes costs to harvesting, the
points on the static PPF will likely not be maintained, with the important exception
of the intercepts. Depending on the parameters, the PPF can now be bowed-in and
the problem can become non-convex due to production externalities, as shown in
the seminal paper by Baumol and Bradford (1972). The basic argument is that
producing the two goods jointly renders some convex combinations infeasible due
to the negative external e®ect. Consequently, points on the linear short-run PPF
become infeasible in the long-run. In their 1999 paper, Copeland and Taylor show
that such non-convexities can create surprising specialization and trade e®ects.20
As will be argued below, in our particular case, due to a combination of internal
(intra-industry) and external (inter-industry) negative stock e®ects, the shape of
the PPF turns out to be more complex.
However, before these speci¯c results are derived, a discussion of the Baumol
and Bradford (1972) result that production externalities are su±cient to cause
non-convex production sets deserves a brief digression that hopefully helps build
some intuition. Here we will just summarize the argument in diagrammatic form.
Assume the M industry is polluting the environment, imposing a negative spillover
e®ect on the industry that is sensitive to the quality of certain elements of the
environment, A.21 If there is a preferred (low cost) location for both outputs, then
the production possibility frontier PPF is convex (the production set is non-convex)
and spatial separation can in fact act as a "palliative" to the problem, by expanding
the feasible production set.
Starting with a concave PPF (no externality)22 and increasing the level of the
negative externality between sectors, the production frontier will bend towards the
origin, and eventually become convex. Key to the reasoning is the fact that the end
points of the PPF, namely E and C will not move when the externality becomes
more signi¯cant, as they represent cases of total specialization in production, and
thus, cases where cross-sectoral spillovers are immaterial. The convex production
possibilities frontier EFGC corresponds to joint production of both inputs in the
same location. If A is moved to the higher cost location, BC will be the relevant
PPF, while in the case when M is moved there, AD will be the PPF.23
20 See Copeland and Taylor (1999), p. 139
21 M represents energy and A laundry producers in their example. Note the fact that the
use of air pollution is avoided, as this would be unambiguously a®ecting consumers' utility and
complicate the analysis.
22 suppose the polluting industry is just starting the dirty manufacturing
23 Note that AD and BC do not have to be linear and can, in fact, be concave.10 HORAT »IU A. RUS
Figure 3
Thus, the production possibility set is non-convex provided the externality is
strong enough. Moreover, spatial separation allows for higher total output, il-
lustrated by the fact that the line segments AF and CG are situated above the
respective arc/curve regions.
Returning to our speci¯c model, we now move on to establish the curvature of
the PPF in the long run autarky. We ¯rst state a somewhat surprising observation
and postpone the analysis of its implications in an e®ort to keep the model as simple
as possible.
Proposition 1. Depending on parameter values, it is possible that the long-run
optimum involves partial unemployment of the labour force.
An algebraic derivation is suggested in Appendix D. Intuitively, the long-run
stock of the resource is decreasing in the total labour applied to harvesting and
manufacturing. It may then be optimal, given some parametric conditions, that
total utility maximization involves leaving a fraction LU of total population un-
employed. This is easier to accept when a social planner solves the optimization
problem. Here, however, we excluded any conscious planning or optimal manage-
ment of the resources (S, L) whatsoever.24 The introduction of another entirely
`clean' sector will allow getting around the unemployment issue. Here, keeping this
¯rst model manageable dictates the exclusion of these interesting possibilities.
Assuming from now on full employment in the steady state, recall the short run
PPF25 was L = M + H
qS. Also, from equation (2.1) one can write the change in the






) ¡ qS(L ¡ M) ¡ ®M:




) ¡ qS(L ¡ M) ¡ ®M = 0:
24 Here, atomistic consumers do not realize that by increasing their e®ort the stock level is
reduced and so will supply the full amount of labour in a Nash equilibrium.





And the labour constraint can be written as:
(2.10) L = M +
H
qS
To ¯nd the long-run PPF, we need to solve (2.9) for S and plug it into the expression
(2.10) above. Solving the quadratic equation and deriving the production possibil-
ities frontier involves some uninformative algebra, and is relegated to Appendix A.






[q(L ¡ M) ¡ r]2K2 ¡ 4r®KM ¡ [q(L ¡ M) ¡ r]Kg







K2q2(L ¡ M)2 + r2K2 ¡ 2qK2(L ¡ M) ¡ 4®rKM¡Kq(L¡M)+rK]:
As Appendix A details, convexity of the production possibility set reduces to the
condition that a cubic in M be higher than zero, or the PPFLR is convex for:
4K2q4(L ¡ M)3 ¡ 3Kq2(3Kq ¡ 2®r)(L ¡ M)2 ¡ 12®Kq2rM(L ¡ M) + (3K2q2r2
+3K2q2 + 4®2r2 ¡ 8®Kqr)(L ¡ M) + 4®r(Kq ¡ 2®r)M ¡ Kr2(Kq ¡ 2®r) > 0;
where ®, K, q, r are parameters, L is the given population. As is apparent from
this, the steady-state PPF is concave for some levels of M, given the parameters,
and convex for others.
Proposition 2. The long-run production possibilities frontier in M-H commod-
ity space is convex-concave.
Some further analysis implies that the cubic in M is positive for all values of
M below a certain threshold M¤ and negative for the others. In other words, the
PPFLR is concave (8) M > M¤ and is convex (8) M < M¤ for a certain limit level
of M¤, a function of the parameters of the system. Then, given the single in°exion
point M¤, the autarkic steady-state PPF will look like in Figure 4.26
26 Allowing for the possibility that some workers are idle in equilibrium does not change this
qualitative result.12 HORAT »IU A. RUS
Notice that the PPF is convex in a neighbourhood of the H-axis, for values of
M lower than the threshold M¤ and concave in a neighbourhood of the M-axis, for
values of M greater than M¤. The result concurs with the ¯ndings in Herberg and
Kemp (1969)27 and Panagariya (1981),
28 which discuss the shape of the production
possibilities curve when two sectors have di®erent returns to scale.
In our case, the shape of the PPF could be explained intuitively as follows. When
stock level is relatively high, the more damaging activity is harvesting. However,
when stock decreases and harvesting becomes less e±cient due to the implicit stock
externality, manufacturing may become the more harmful activity.
29 For levels of
M production lower than M*, starting from the case where all the labour force
is involved in harvesting and stock is relatively low, an extra worker shifted from
H to M will have a decreasing opportunity cost, due to the fact that the shift to
M impacts negatively on the productivity of labour in H. So, besides the direct
level e®ect of reducing the labour applied to H, moving an extra worker to M
production has a detrimental (negative but increasing) e®ect on the productivity of
the remaining workers in H. However, beyond the threshold level M*, manufacturing
starts having a lower negative impact on productivity in H than harvesting itself.
30
In other words, when there is a lot of manufacturing, stock is relatively high and
harvesting is the more damaging activity for the resource. Then we are in the
concave part of the PPF, where shifting an extra worker from H to M has an
increasing opportunity cost due to the additional productivity bene¯t in H.
Proposition 3. The autarkic equilibrium is not e±cient. It depends on the rela-
tive demand for the two commodities and on the relative strength of the externalities
as sources of ine±ciency.
The shape of the PPF is important in deciding the pattern of specialization
triggered by trade. Still looking at the closed economy, the autarkic equilibrium
outputs determined in section 2.3 are: HA = q¯LSA which implies ¯L = H
A
qSA =
HAp and L = M
A














p is in fact the relative price line in
Figure 4 above. Then we can compare the slope of the PPF at the equilibrium with
the slope of the relative price. The condition that the slope of the PPF is higher









Notice that for ¯ > 1
2, i.e. when domestic taste for H is strong and the equilibrium
occurs in the convex part of the PPF, the price line can be °atter than the PPF
27 See p. 414. Note that for the shape of the PPF around H = 0 in Fig.4 it su±ces that we
have DRS in H.
28 The result is also discussed in Ethier (1982), p. 1263.
29 The condition for M to be less harmful than H in autarky is S >
®(1¡¯)
q¯ and is more
likely to hold the higher the stock level. This condition makes intuitive sense if we recall that it
is harder to catch the resource when it is sparse, whereas the marginal damage from pollution
is stock-independent. To make things interesting, we assume this condition can hold given our
parameters.
30 As derived in Appendix B, stock is not a monotonic function of M. In particular, @SA
@M <
0 for M < M and @SA
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slope. Similarly, if ¯ < 1
2, i.e. when domestic taste for M is strong the price line
tends to be steeper than the PPF at the autarkic equilibrium.
In the ¯rst case, with more general preferences, two equilibria can emerge, one
in the convex, one in the concave part of the PPF, while in the second case the
internal equilibrium is unique. It is argued in Appendix C that in a static setting,
opening up to trade from such an autarkic equilibrium can bring about any pattern
of specialization/diversi¯cation, as international trade acts as a vent for the internal
inter-sectoral tensions existing in the autarkic economy. We will return to use the
results in the next section of the paper.
Therefore, the autarkic equilibrium is likely to be situated at a point where the
price line is not tangent to the PPF, due to the external e®ects. If the domestic price
line is steeper than the PPF at equilibrium, the market undervalues the true cost of
the harvesting good H. Expanding production of M generates a negative externality
on H, the \private" exceeds the \social" marginal productivity of labour in M and
so there is overemployment of labour in M compared to what is e±cient. If, on the
contrary, the domestic price line is °atter than the slope of the PPF at equilibrium,
the market undervalues the true cost of M due to the open-access externality. The
following discussion of the e®ects of trade will assume the ¯rst scenario: there is a
relatively strong domestic demand for M, the autarkic price line steeper than the
slope of the production frontier and a unique autarkic equilibrium.31
Proposition 4. The supply of manufacturing is not monotonic over the feasible
price: there exists a critical point where the slope of supply of M changes sign.
In order to study the stability properties of the autarkic equilibrium, plug the
expression for the stock derived in (2.11) into the relation between the relative price






[q(L ¡ M) ¡ r]2K2 ¡ 4r®KM ¡ [q(L ¡ M) ¡ r]K
The sign of the ¯rst derivative of SA with respect to M is not unambiguous.32 We
get the su±cient condition that the supply of M is upward sloping for:






While this is not a necessary condition33 and so it does not allow by exclusion the
identi¯cation of a complementary inequality that makes the supply upward sloping,
it shows that supply can be downward sloping over a range.
The intuition behind Figure 5 is the following: Initially, higher M yields lower
stock level S and lower productivity in H, which causes labour to shift from H to
M and lowers the price necessary for ¯rms in M to break even, as 1
p = qS. This
is a result commonly obtained in the increasing returns to scale trade models.34
Increasing production of manufacturing goods beyond M requires a higher price
due to the fact that production moves along the PPF in the concave section, where
the opportunity cost of producing more manufactures is increasing. Notice from
equation (2.12) that the relationship between M-production and the relative price
31 See Eaton and Panagariya (1979), p. 590, for a similar discussion.
32 See appendix B for derivation.
33 Such a condition has a much more complicated expression. See Appendix B for details.
34 E.g. Ethier (1982).14 HORAT »IU A. RUS
is not monotonic, and so the price increases after supply of M reaches a threshold
value.
As Copeland and Taylor (1999) note,35 generally, multiplicity of equilibria is -
even in closed economies - a feature of the IRS models. Here, due to our utility
assumption, demand for M is MD = (1¡¯)L a vertical line in the (M;p) space like
in Figure 5, and the autarkic equilibrium is at E or E'. In autarky the economy will
stay diversi¯ed due to the fact that both goods are essential for consumers. When
opening up to trade, the small open economy takes world price pw as given and three
possible equilibria emerge. The IRS literature result is that a diversi¯ed equilibrium
with trade becomes problematic (it is unstable) and specialization becomes possible.
However, as we argued before, all this is valid here only for a range of M values
(lower than M). For the other possible levels of manufacturing good production we
can have a diversi¯ed equilibrium even under free trade.36












Thus, as can be seen in Figure 5, there are stable trading equilibria both when
the economy is specialized and when diversi¯ed. Trade opportunities create an
in¯nitely elastic demand for the goods produced domestically. If domestic demand
for M under autarky is at MD < M, trading (at domestic prices) will make the
autarkic equilibrium unstable. A small perturbation that increases production of
the manufacturing good will be self-reinforcing and push for specialization in M. If
domestic demand is at MD
0
> M, the autarkic equilibrium will still be stable and
35 See argument on p. 145, Copeland and Taylor (1999).
36 Note that by altering the structure of the problem we may eliminate some of the cases and
make the results clearer. Yet, one of the purposes of the paper is to show that under the conditions
speci¯ed in the model, any specialization / diversi¯cation outcome is possible once the economy
opens up to trade. This is a source of the di®erent results from the literature.RENEWABLE RESOURCES, POLLUTION AND TRADE IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 15
so no specialization is induced if trade begins at autarkic prices. The analysis is
simpler when considering trade at international prices that di®er from the pre-trade
domestic price. For world prices (1=pw) low enough the economy will completely
specialize in H, while for prices high enough, the economy will specialize in M, as
is apparent from the graph.
3. The Open Economy Equilibrium
In the Brander and Taylor (1997) model, a country that exports the manufactur-
ing good must gain from trade, and a country that has a comparative advantage in
the resource good but fails to fully specialize in it necessarily losses from trade. In
the present model this need not happen, as increased pollution caused by special-
ization in the dirty good hurts the resource.37 Partially specializing in M increases
the pollution pressure on the stock of the resource if M is more damaging than H.
Full specialization in H may make the small open economy better o®. From here
one can learn that a successful industrialization process in a resource-abundant
developing-country must take pollution into account.
The analysis of the welfare changes brought about by trade in our small economy
looks ¯rst at the short-run impact and then the long-run e®ects are derived. In the
short-run, the PPF is linear. When opening up to trade, the small economy takes
as given the international price pw. If we denote by p the autarky steady-state
price, there are three possible cases: p < pw, p > pw or p = pw. If p > pw, the
country has a comparative advantage in M, will start by specializing in M (if the
world demand for M is strong enough, which we assume here for the small economy
case). Then M = L and the stock will evolve to SM. Depending on the parameters,
we may get extinction of the stock if SM becomes zero.
If p < pw, the country has a comparative advantage in H, will specialize in H
(again, given world demand for H is \large"). There will be more harvesting in the
economy, so the overexploitation problem worsens, but there is no pollution-related
negative impact on the stock. In a second case, if p = pw, the international price
is exactly equal to the autarkic opportunity cost of producing H, and so there are
no areas of comparative advantage. However, if the autarky-inherited equilibrium
is perturbed by increasing the M production, then productivity in the H-sector
declines if the stock decreases - i.e. ST < SA- as a result of the perturbation.38 If
the autarkic equilibrium were at a point like E in Figure 5, this is a self-reinforcing
process, leading to specialization in M, and so the initial autarkic diversi¯ed equi-
librium is unstable. If at E' in autarky, the pre-trade equilibrium is stable and there
will be no welfare changes taking place. If, on the contrary, ST > SA, meaning that
37 A similar conclusion is reached by Hannesson (2000). He takes the Brander and Taylor model
(which assumes constant returns to scale in the production of the other goods) and introduces
decreasing returns in the other (non-resource) sector. The outcome is the inverse of the Brander
and Taylor result: the country that partially specializes in the resource sector can gain from
trade, as the losses of increasing production in the diminishing returns alternative sector can be
limited through imports. Our setup di®ers from his in that it explicitly considers the production
externality and the returns are constant in the manufacturing sector and could be decreasing in
the resource sector. So, while he obtains a hump-shaped steady-state PPF, ours looks like in
Figure 4.
38 Like in Copeland and Taylor (1999), p. 147.16 HORAT »IU A. RUS
the M sector is relatively less harmful to the natural resource than harvesting, then
productivity in H improves and the economy will return to a diversi¯ed production
state.
The e®ect of trade on welfare can be seen in a simple setting that depicts the
short-run responses of the PPF and PPC.
3.1. Comparative advantage in the resource good.
For Case 1, p < pw leads to comparative advantage in the resource good and
specialization in H in the small open economy. If H specialization is more harmful
than diversi¯ed autarkic production, then the stock of resource decreases and so
does the feasible level of H. Then the PPF rotates downward as in Figure 6, bringing
the PPC down with it. In the short run (SR) there are welfare gains, as the feasible
budget set is now the upper price line in Figure 6, while the PPF is still the autarkic
one. However, overexploitation of the resource dominates the bene¯cial pollution
reduction as far as the stock is concerned and so the autarkic equilibrium becomes
unfeasible. In the long run (LR) the stock S is lower and welfare (W) is lower
because the feasible consumption set shrinks, and we eventually get diversi¯cation







If, on the contrary, SA < SH and the specialization in H allows the stock to
actually rebound, the PPF rotates upward and the country experiences short-run
gains from trade, as can be seen in Figure 7. Here, unlike in Brander and Taylor
(1997), initial specialization in H may make the country better o®. This result is
obtained due to the bene¯cial result of spatial separation of industries. If the man-
ufacturing is relatively more damaging to the resource, trade allows for an avenue
to decrease the tensions created by the pollution externality. Like in Copeland and
Taylor (1999), this non-traditional source of gains from trade can - for some values
of the parameters - o®set the fact that the other source of ine±ciency, namely the
open access problem, inevitably worsens.
39 This is con¯rmed in Appendix C, where Figure C1 depicts the movement from the autarkic







3.2. No areas of comparative advantage for the small open economy.
For the relatively more complicated Case 2, p = pw does not confer any clear
comparative advantage to the country opening up to trade. If we assume a pertur-
bation by slightly increasing M-production, then H-production decreases as a result
of the externality. If M is relatively more damaging, then S falls, production of H
falls more in the longer run, like in Figure 8.40 In the extreme case of complete spe-
cialization in M, the economy does not experience a welfare loss from trade in the
long-run, as the pre-trade bundle is still feasible because the PPC stays unchanged






40 Here we can potentially get extinction of the stock due to the self-reinforcing pattern of
comparative advantage in M.
41 This result parallels one obtained in Brander and Taylor (1997).18 HORAT »IU A. RUS
If M is relatively less damaging, S rises, H-production rises and the PPF rotates
up like in Figure 9. Therefore, the stock increases and also welfare increases. How-
ever, as labour productivity is higher in H, there will be a shift of workers from M
to H and the PPF can rotate back to be again coincidental with the international
price line and a diversi¯ed equilibrium obtains again in the long run. The overall







If, however, the perturbation of the diversi¯ed equilibrium is done by positively
shocking H-production, then if H is relatively more damaging we can get the sit-
uation in Figure 6 above. Starting at E in Figure 5, the diversi¯ed equilibrium is
unstable and it yields lower S and lower W. Yet, starting at E', there will be no
welfare e®ect in the long run for the diversi¯ed economy, as the production point
will return to the pre-trade position. If H is relatively less damaging, then we get a
situation similar to the one illustrated in Figure 7 above, the diversi¯ed equilibrium
is unstable and we can get higher S and W. Note here how trade arises as a means
to spatially separate the two industries even in the absence of a price-dictated
comparative advantage.42
Thus, to summarize the discussion of these two cases, we can state the following
result:
Proposition 5. Specialization in the resource sector can be welfare improving
in the long run, provided that harvesting is relatively less damaging to the growth
of the resource.
3.3. Comparative advantage in the manufactured good.
In a third case, p > pw the country has a comparative advantage in the manufac-
turing good production and can increase M-production. Again, given the relative
harm in°icted by the two sectors on the stock of renewable resource, the economy
may lose from trade. In Figure 9, if H is relatively more damaging for the stock,
specializing in M reduces the pressure on the resource and allows the PPF to ro-
tate upwards, increasing the productivity in harvesting. When the PPF becomes
coincidental with the world price line 1=pw, a diversi¯ed equilibrium is possible
42 This is one of the de¯ning features of the Copeland and Taylor (1999) model.RENEWABLE RESOURCES, POLLUTION AND TRADE IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 19
where the economy can experience a long run welfare gain, even though the PPF
can actually rotate back, depending on the production mix. However, if the manu-
facturing sector is relatively more damaging, the economy will behave similarly to
what we already described in Figure 6 above. Here the economy experiences net
loses in welfare terms in all cases except the long-run full specialization in M case.
Thus:
Proposition 6. Specialization in the manufacturing sector can be welfare re-
ducing in the long run, provided that harvesting is relatively less damaging to the
growth of the resource.
Intuitively, the tradeo®s at play here are the following: If pA < pw, then H
can expand and M can contract and so adding to the usual gains from trade, the
overdepletion problem worsens, while the pollution problem improves. If pA > pw,
M can expand and H can contract and the economy experiences less overdepletion,
but more pollution to add to the gains from trade. Note that while even partial
spatial separation of the two sectors allowed by trade adds to welfare, the persisting
externality acts in the opposite direction. This leads to net results that are less
categorical than those in the baseline models. To summarize the results above,
taking our preferred case whereby manufacturing sector is in°icting relatively more
damage on the stock (per unit of e®ort) than the harvesting per se,43 we can say
that opening up to trade seems to bene¯t the small open economy if it specializes in
the traditional/environment-based sector. A resource exporter bene¯ts from trade,
taking advantage of the separation of the two industries, while a resource importer
can in fact do worse than in autarky, as pollution problem worsens. This result is
largely due to the fact that here the production externality dominates the overaccess
problem. The results are changing dramatically if the relative harmfulness of the
two sectors is inversed: If harvesting is more damaging for the resource, exporting
H is welfare reducing, while specializing in M is welfare improving in this case.
Here the overaccess externality dominates pollution in its negative e®ects and the
economy does better by industrializing.
4. Conclusion
To conclude, our model is di®erent in its predictions from the two models that
were used as benchmarks. In Copeland and Taylor (1999), free trade was welfare
improving for the small economy. In Brander and Taylor (1997) free trade was
dominated by autarky from a welfare perspective. In our model with renewable
resource and negative production externality, if the small open economy specializes
in the sector that is less damaging for the stock of resource, trade can be welfare
improving. We have shown that in our model, unlike Brander and Taylor (1997),
specialization is possible in both sectors,44 and that the small resource-abundant
and exporting open economy does not necessarily have to lose from trade, if there
exists the collateral bene¯cial separation e®ect of the two industries. Trade exacer-
bates the open-access over-harvesting. Yet, by the industry separation permitted by
openness, the negative production externality declines in importance as a source of
ine±ciency. Moreover, complete specialization in the resource good is not needed in
order to gain from trade. If H is relatively harmless for the resource stock, there will
43 This could be rationalized by the fact that harvesting a®ects only a fraction of the stock,
while pollution has a broader and longer-lasting impact on the resource.
44 In their model only specialization in the production of the manufacturing good is possible.20 HORAT »IU A. RUS
be gains. Unlike the Copeland and Taylor (1999) model, free trade may be welfare
reducing, even when there is initial specialization in production, if specialization
takes place in the relatively more environmentally-harmful sector.
The central message of the paper is that pollution can have non-negligible
welfare e®ects even when there are no signi¯cant negative repercussions for con-
sumers (possibly due to a relatively clean overall environment in a developing econ-
omy). Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) literature-inspired advice that income-
augmenting development eventually brings cleaner environment may be misguided
due to the existence of negative production spillovers. It is argued that the coun-
try may lose in welfare terms even when exporting the dirty good. This occurs
because of the negative resource stock e®ect of the dirty good manufacturing and
the repercussions on the \traditional" or environment-intensive sector. Under this
scenario, even though overexploitation of the open-access resource is not a problem
exacerbated by trade openness, pollution depletes the resource and brings down
productivity in the resource-intensive sector. To the extent that the negative e®ect
dominates, the country as a whole loses from trade. On the other hand, it appears
that if the small open economy specializes in the resource good, even incompletely,
it may stand to gain from trade. In short, a possible policy lesson for a developing
renewable resource-rich economy is that industrializing at the expense of traditional
sectors may in fact lead to welfare losses, while specialization in the resource-based
sectors may lead to gains.
The paper looks at open access resources in a small open economy. Possible
extensions, that include endogenizing the international trading price formation in
a two-country setting, allowing for environmental policy in the form of taxes, or
establishment of property rights, together with are candidate subjects for future
study.
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